The Lengthy Brazilian Crisis Is Not Yet Over by Fausto, Sergio
ISSUE BRIEF 02.17.17
The Lengthy Brazilian Crisis Is Not Yet Over
Sergio Fausto, Contributing Expert, Latin America Initiative
Since the first quarter of 2014, Brazil has 
been living in “crisis mode.” September 
2016 marked seven consecutive quarters of 
negative economic growth that resulted in a 
cumulative negative variation in the GDP of 
more than 7 percent, the greatest recession 
ever registered in the country. In the 
same period, investigations conducted by 
public attorneys and Brazil’s federal police 
uncovered the largest corruption scheme 
in Brazilian history. The scandal was rooted 
in the largest state-owned company in the 
country, Petrobras, but had widespread 
ramifications. By the end of December 2016, 
nearly 200 people had been indicted or 
imprisoned. Most were businessmen and 
politicians, including the former president 
of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who was 
a defendant in five judicial inquiries. At the 
confluence of the economic and political 
crises, President Dilma Rousseff, a member 
of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) and 
reelected in October 2014 to a four-year 
term, was removed from office in April 2016 
and permanently impeached the following 
September. She was replaced by Vice 
President Michel Temer, who is affiliated 
with the Partido do Movimento Democrático 
do Brasil (PMDB).
 The economic crisis and the corruption 
probe (called Operação Lava Jato, or 
Operation Car Wash) destroyed the 
power system that had been expanding 
throughout the PT administrations from 
2003 to 2016. This system was composed 
of an ideologically heterogeneous alliance 
of parties under the PT’s hegemony; trade 
unions; state-owned companies’ pension 
funds, which were controlled by unionists 
affiliated with the PT; and a relatively 
restricted but powerful group of companies 
that were the primary beneficiaries of 
federal government-subsidized credit and 
contracts. With resources diverted from 
state-owned companies, these private 
companies provided electoral funding 
for the dominant political coalition (the 
opposition also received funding, but on 
a smaller scale). Intellectually speaking, 
it is an interesting case of an attempt to 
develop state capitalism in a competitive 
political environment. The lesson to be 
learned is that this kind of experiment 
ends up undermining democracy by 
giving the incumbents an extraordinary 
electoral advantage and compromising 
the system of checks and balances, and/
or generating fiscal disarray and financial 
crisis. In the case of Brazil, the experiment 
was interrupted before democracy mutated 
into a semi-democratic regime. That it fell 
short of causing a mutation in the nature 
of the political structure can be explained 
to a great extent by the strength of some 
institutions: the independence of the judicial 
branch, the autonomy of public attorneys, 
and the freedom of the press, all of which 
are guaranteed by the Brazilian Constitution 
and upheld by society.
 The destruction of the party’s system 
that was dominant between 2003 and 
2015 turned into a crisis of the entire 
political system, as the opposition parties 
also became involved in the criminal 
investigations carried out by the Lava Jato 
operation. This picture is similar to the 
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commodities-producing countries led to 
Brazil’s long-term sovereign credit rating 
being raised to “investment grade” in 
2008. In this context, Lula’s government 
felt emboldened to distinguish itself from 
its predecessor. Second, in 2006 Petrobras 
announced the discovery of reserves in the 
pre-salt layer located in ultra-deep waters 
within the country’s maritime territory. 
They were estimated to be large enough 
to double the proven petroleum and gas 
reserves of the country. Thus strengthened, 
Brazil responded effectively to the impacts 
of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 
by adopting counter-cyclical fiscal and 
monetary policies made possible by the 
economic gains obtained during Lula’s first 
term. The resulting economic contraction 
was intense but short-lived. Much deeper 
and longer-lasting, however, was the 
ideological impact of the financial crisis. 
It seemed to confirm the long-held belief 
of most of the Latin American left in the 
unsustainability of liberal capitalism, as 
well as in the superiority of state capitalism 
as an instrument of national development 
for developing countries (now rebranded 
“emerging countries”).  These three factors 
resulted in the introduction of fateful policy 
changes in Lula’s second term, which were 
to be deepened under Dilma Rousseff’s 
administration. 
 Petrobras played a major role in the 
“national development” venture that took 
shape almost in tandem with the global 
financial crisis. To that effect, in 2010 
the government used its super-majority 
in Congress to approve a package of 
interrelated bills changing the regulatory 
structure established to govern the oil and 
gas industry after the end of Petrobras 
monopoly under Cardoso. The bills were 
approved with much nationalistic fanfare 
in the midst of a presidential campaign 
that would lead then-Chief of Staff Dilma 
Rousseff to the presidency. This legislation 
created a new regulatory structure for the 
pre-salt region.
 Under the new structure, all exploration 
and production activities in the pre-salt 
region were to be conducted exclusively 
by Petrobras. Foreign investment was 
permitted only as long as Petrobras held at 
one that prevailed in Italy in the wake of 
the Mani Pulite investigation in the mid-
1990s. Conducted by public attorneys, 
this investigation revealed the existence 
of widespread and systematic corruption 
schemes involving businesses and political 
parties. As a consequence, the Italian 
political party system that had developed 
since the end of World War II collapsed. In 
Brazil, however, the political crisis came in 
conjunction with a deep economic crisis.
 In the short span of this issue brief, I 
analyze both the anatomy of these mutually 
reinforcing crises and the challenges that 
Brazil faces in overcoming them.
FROM THE PRE-SALT TRIUMPHALISM 
TO THE PETROBRAS TRAGEDY
Lula’s first term in office (2003-2007) 
demonstrated continuity with the economic 
policies adopted by his predecessor, 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso. During his 
two terms in office from 1995 to 2003, 
Cardoso brought decades of chronically 
high inflation to an end and liberalized the 
Brazilian economy, ending state monopolies 
on oil and gas and telecommunications, 
among other infrastructural sectors. He 
also created independent agencies to 
regulate competition in these sectors and 
eliminated legal discriminatory treatment 
against foreign direct investment. Long-
term commitments with sustainable public 
accounts and low inflation were translated 
into new institutions such as the Fiscal 
Responsibility Law, which was approved in 
2000. These commitments, as well as the 
general framework of Cardoso’s economic 
policy, were kept by Lula in his first term 
in office. This started to change during his 
second term (2007-2011). 
 Three factors produced this change: 
First, by maintaining his predecessor’s 
economic policies and even tightening fiscal 
policy in his first year, Lula’s administration 
rapidly dissipated initial market distrust and 
benefited hugely from the commodities 
boom that started in 2004. The combination 
of consistent macroeconomic policies 
domestically and an extremely favorable 
economic atmosphere abroad for 
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least a 30 percent share in any consortium 
formed to bid in the region. A new local 
content policy—much stricter and more 
detailed than the prior one—was applied 
to the oil and gas productive chain. A 
production sharing agreement (PSA)—used 
almost exclusively in authoritarian regimes—
was substituted for the concessions 
program that had been adopted with great 
success after the end of Petrobras monopoly 
(the old structure remained in place for 
areas outside the pre-salt region). 
 Such a major policy change can only be 
explained by the confluence of ideological 
and more practical factors. To increase the 
participation of the Brazilian state in the 
future revenue stream that would come out 
of this new source of wealth, adopting a 
higher level of taxation for the pre-salt region 
would have sufficed. But Lula’s government 
insisted that changing the regulatory 
structure was the only way to ensure that 
the oil coming out of the pre-salt region 
would belong to Brazil. They invoked the 
slogan O petróleo é nosso (“The oil is ours”), 
reminiscent of the nationalistic campaign 
that led to the creation of Petrobras as a 
monopolistic company in the 1950s. 
 After the pre-salt discovery, the 
expansion of investments in the petroleum 
and gas sector became, all at once, one of 
the main gears of the Brazilian economy 
and the principal source of financing for 
the parties belonging to the coalition led 
by the PT. The overbilling of approximately 
US$2 billion in contracts irrigated a vast 
and heterogeneous political coalition that 
included 13 parties at its high point. The 
electoral donations were the counterpart of 
the resources diverted from Petrobras to a 
cartel of approximately 20 contractors that 
was commanded by the five largest ones. 
Odebrecht, a leading Brazilian multinational 
company in heavy construction and the 
petrochemicals industry (in association with 
Petrobras), occupied a position of primus 
inter pares. Chosen by the PT government 
to be a national champion, Odebrecht was 
granted the lion’s share of government 
contracts domestically and was financially 
and politically leveraged abroad, particularly 
in countries where governments closely 
aligned with the PT and Lula were in power. 
 Between 2011 and 2015, the Petrobras 
investment program quadrupled in 
comparison with the previous five years. To 
finance this unrealistic program, Petrobras 
started to rapidly acquire debt. At the 
same time, it lost revenue due to the 
government-dictated policy of deterring 
inflation by controlling the price of fuel and 
saw its expenditures rise as a result of the 
excesses of the national content policy. 
Between 2009 and 2015, Petrobras’ debt 
increased five-fold—becoming the largest 
corporate debtor on Earth—and its capacity 
for cash-flow generation was considerably 
reduced, bringing the company to the brink 
of financial ruin.
THE DOOMED INHERITANCE FROM 
DILMA ROUSSEFF
The Petrobras disaster is the most prominent 
case in a general process of deterioration 
affecting Brazil’s economy and public 
accounts that had grown throughout 
President Rousseff’s first term.
 Between 2011 and 2014, all the 
macroeconomic pillars established during 
Cardoso’s presidency (1995-2002) were 
shaken. Those pillars had proven to be 
instrumental for Brazil’s economic takeoff 
under Lula’s administration, which took 
place in an external environment that was 
highly favorable to commodities-producing 
countries. Rousseff not only abandoned 
the policy of generating fiscal surpluses to 
reduce the public debt but also compromised 
the principles of fiscal transparency and 
accountability established in the Fiscal 
Responsibility Law. She also undermined the 
policy of inflation targeting—putting both the 
monetary policy structure and the de facto 
autonomy of the Central Bank in jeopardy—
and undercut the floating exchange rate 
policy as well. In the field of microeconomics, 
she introduced numerous distortions via 
ad hoc tax exemptions and control of 
administered prices, among other means.
 At the root of this astounding series 
of mistakes in conducting the economic 
policy was a deep-seated matrix of Brazilian 
economic thinking, which includes the idea 
that national development depends on the 
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with a view to generating a pre-interest 
surplus of 1 percent of the GDP in 2015—a 
fiscal shift equivalent to 3 percent of the GDP 
and all the more difficult to be implemented 
in an economy already in recession. This 
shift proved to be unfeasible, even more so 
because the government was forced by a 
ruling of the Federal Court of Accounts to 
recognize liabilities that were not accounted 
for in previous years (between 2011 
and 2014, public banks paid for treasury 
expenses with their own funds in ever-
growing numbers).
 One year after being appointed, with the 
inflation rate above 11 percent, an ongoing 
recession, and fiscal adjustment measures 
blocked due to lack of political support, Levy 
was fired. Rousseff’s administration entered 
its death throes. By the end of April 2016, a 
two-thirds vote by the Chamber of Deputies 
authorized the initiation of the president’s 
impeachment trial in the Senate. The 
aforementioned unaccounted-for liabilities 
provided the judicial basis for the president’s 
political judgment, since they represented 
a violation of the Fiscal Responsibility Law. 
With the impeachment authorized by the 
Chamber of Deputies and accepted by the 
Senate, the president was removed.
 The replacement of Rousseff with 
her vice president, Michel Temer, in May 
2016 awakened positive expectations in 
the domestic and international markets 
and also in the political system. For the 
markets, the change in government 
represented the possibility of correcting the 
disastrous economic policies of the previous 
administration. For the political system, it 
meant the possibility of somehow limiting 
the prominence of the judicial branch and 
the advancement in the investigations of the 
Lava Jato operation. Up until that point, the  
investigations had dealt mainly with the PT 
and the Partido Progressista (PP), a right-
wing party that had been a member of the 
government-backing coalition since the 
beginning of the PT administrations.
 In the final moments of her government, 
Rousseff appointed Lula as chief of 
staff. The former president was her last 
remaining strategic asset in her attempt 
to rebuild her support base, especially in 
state’s active role in leading investment 
either directly via state-owned companies 
or indirectly, by funneling subsidized credit 
to the private sector. According to this 
belief, economic policy should also try to 
proactively determine relative prices in 
order to favor growth, even at the expense 
of stability. This line of thought became 
influential in Lula’s administration and 
achieved dominance when Rousseff took 
office. The prospect of a second recessive 
dive of the global economy—a risk that 
increased by the end of 2011—was the 
justification that had previously been 
missing for an attack on all fronts on the 
so-called “neoliberal” inheritance from 
the Cardoso administration, which for the 
most part had been preserved during Lula’s 
administration.
 The only reason that the economic 
disaster produced by Rousseff was not on a 
larger scale was because foreign exchange 
reserves remained high. In the absence 
of a crisis in the balance of payments, the 
deterioration of the Brazilian economy—
which had become visible to analysts 
starting in 2011-2012—took awhile to be felt 
by the majority of the population. Although 
the economic growth rate decreased to less 
than half of the average of the previous four 
years, barely surpassing 1.5 percent annually, 
the unemployment rate kept declining, 
reaching less than 5 percent by the end of 
President Rousseff’s first term.
ROUSSEFF’S SHORT SECOND TERM
In October 2014, the president was reelected 
by a difference of only three points over 
Aécio Neves, a Partido da Social Democracia 
Brasileira (PSDB) candidate. In her campaign, 
Rousseff promised more of the same policies 
and accused her adversaries of intending to 
destroy the “social achievements” of the 
PT administrations with a draconian fiscal 
adjustment.
 In December 2014, she appointed an 
orthodox economist named Joaquim Levy 
as minister of finance, executing a program 
shift without precedent in Brazilian history. 
Levy promoted a correction of fuel and 
energy prices and instituted budgetary cuts 
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Congress. However, the Supreme Federal 
Court prevented Lula from taking office, 
claiming that such an appointment aimed 
to obstruct justice (Lula was already under 
investigation). In wiretapping authorized by 
the Judiciary and made public by the press, 
the former president made it clear that it 
was time for politicians to fight back against 
the Lava Jato operation. Blocked from 
taking office, he was not able to lead the 
counterattack that most of the politicians 
had looked forward to. 
THE NEW ADMINISTRATION
Although Temer took office provisionally 
with a very low popularity rate, the 
majority of the population did not consider 
him illegitimate (support for Rousseff’s 
impeachment stayed above 50 percent 
starting in March 2015, when it first 
became a rallying cry). The accusation that 
President Rousseff had been overthrown by 
a “parliamentary coup” had much greater 
resonance abroad than in Brazil.
 The new president appointed a team 
with indisputable technical credentials to fill 
positions at the core of the government’s 
economic sector—roles in the Ministry of 
Finance, the Central Bank, the National 
Bank of Economic and Social Development, 
Petrobras, and Eletrobras (a federal 
holding of the electric energy-generating 
companies)—and formed a cabinet with 
representatives from all parties, with the 
exception of the left-wing parties. He did so 
with the intention of securing the necessary 
majority not only for a confirmation vote of 
impeachment in the Senate, but also for the 
approval of amendments to the Constitution 
considered essential for regaining control 
over public accounts.
 With the economy in recession, the 
new administration opted not to increase 
the already high tax burden, despite the 
deficit in the public sector having reached 
10 percent of the GDP after the payment of 
interest on the public debt by the end of 
2015. It also did not promote any significant 
expenditure cuts, considering that Levy had 
already implemented the possible cuts in 
non-mandatory expenses. The strategy was 
focused on attacking structural factors in 
the expansion of public expenditure.
 In fact, from 1997 to 2015 the total public 
expenditure grew at an average of 6 percent 
above inflation, and mandatory expenditures 
expanded until reaching approximately 90 
percent of the total expenditure. The main 
cause of this trend was the expenditures 
associated with pension benefits, which 
were on the rise due to the rapid aging of 
the Brazilian population and the absence of a 
minimum age for retirement.
 When the revenue growth started to 
slow down in 2011, the structural deficit 
began to reveal itself much more clearly. 
In order to tackle it, Temer’s government 
bet on the approval of two constitutional 
amendment proposals: one establishing a 
cap on federal government expenditures for 
the next 20 years, limiting their increase to 
the previous year’s inflation rate, and the 
other reforming the pension system in both 
the public and private sectors. 
 With an economic team respected 
by the markets and a parliamentary 
majority capable in principle of approving 
these constitutional reforms, the new 
administration came in with a plan of 
putting in motion a virtuous cycle where 
the shock of favorable expectations would 
boost economic recovery sooner rather 
than later, leading to higher popularity 
rates, accumulation of political capital, the 
approval of reforms in Congress, and so on.
 Up until the third quarter of 2016, the 
country watched this script playing out 
accordingly. Asset prices were at a high. The 
constitutional amendment capping public 
expenditures was approved in Congress 
and in municipal elections in October. The 
PT suffered a historic defeat, and the PSDB 
and the PMDB (mostly the former), the 
main parties in the coalition of support for 
Temer’s administration, showed a good 
electoral performance.
THE CRISES ARE NOT OVER
In November and December 2016, a sequence 
of events rapidly changed the scenario, 
showing that Brazil still lives under the aegis 
of political and economic uncertainty.
For the political system, 
it meant the possibility 
of somehow limiting 
the prominence of the 
judicial branch and the 
advancement in the 
investigations of the 
Lava Jato operation. 
For the markets, the 
change in government 
represented the 
possibility of correcting 
the disastrous economic 
policies of the previous 
administration. 
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approving drastic fiscal measures. Street 
protests organized by civil servant unions 
and leftist parties have been happening 
frequently and gaining momentum. Similar 
movements can erupt in other states that 
are also facing acute financial challenges.   
 In this environment, it remains to be 
seen whether the social security reform 
will be approved under terms desired 
by the government. On one hand, the 
calamitous financial situation of large 
states dramatizes the need to reform social 
security, showcasing how unsustainable 
fiscal accounts can turn into social calamity. 
On the other hand, the electoral costs of 
reforming social security are higher in 
the midst of a recession, and Congress is 
sensitive to this.  
 With the deterioration of expectations, 
rumors of an early termination of the Temer 
government started to circulate in December 
2016. Such rumors could become fact under 
two scenarios: one, if the Superior Electoral 
Court (TSE) rules in favor of a lawsuit filed 
by the PSDB against the Rousseff-Temer 
ticket a few months after the 2014 election 
accusing their campaign of being financed 
by resources diverted from Petrobras; and 
two, if Congress approves a constitutional 
amendment calling for early direct elections. 
If the TSE nullifies the Roussef-Temer ticket 
with half of the presidential term fulfilled, 
the Constitution calls for the indirect 
election of a new president by Congress to 
fill the position for the rest of the term.
 Despite the aggravation of the political 
crisis, the possibility of an early interruption 
of the Temer administration seems remote. 
The president has allies in the TSE and 
a large enough majority in Congress to 
prevent the approval of a constitutional 
amendment to call for direct presidential 
elections this year. It is more likely that 
the current president will serve his full 
term. The executive branch’s control over 
Congress was reinforced in February 2017 by 
the election of two of its staunchest allies 
to preside over the Senate and the Lower 
House. This not only reduces the chance of 
Temer’s term been terminated by calling for 
direct presidential elections to almost zero, 
but also increases the chances of Congress 
not watering down social security reform.  
 The release of data on the economic 
activity pertaining to the third quarter of 
2016 showed that the recession is ongoing 
and that a recovery will not happen anytime 
soon. The debt burden on deleveraging 
families and companies is diminishing, 
albeit slowly, with financial costs still 
high, consumption levels low, a high rate 
of unemployment, and family income in 
decline. Also heavily indebted, the public 
sector cannot accelerate a recovery. The 
hope for a faster investment recovery 
boosted by a new privatization and 
concession program is limited by regulatory 
and political uncertainties and by the virtual 
paralysis of the large contractors involved 
in the Lava Jato scandal. In the short term, 
the only factor that favors the expansion of 
the economy is the now-existing space for 
larger cuts in the benchmark interest rate 
established by the Central Bank. With the 
market projections pointing to 4.5 percent 
inflation at the end of 2017, most analysts 
believe the benchmark interest rate can 
drop at least 300 basis points by the end 
of 2017. Still, the market consensus is that 
growth will not exceed 1 percent this year.
 Along with the longer-than-expected 
recession, the Lava Jato investigations 
continue to unfold. The first testimonies, 
made by 77 Odebrecht executives who 
benefited from a plea-bargain agreement 
with the public attorneys, struck a blow to 
president Temer’s inner circle of ministers as 
well as leaders of the PSDB, the main partner 
of the PMDB in the government’s coalition. 
The president himself was mentioned in 
the testimonies, which describe the illegal 
financing of electoral campaigns.
 Three of the largest states (Rio de 
Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and Rio Grande do 
Sul) have also declared a state of financial 
calamity. The federal government is still 
trying to negotiate measures that will 
combine immediate financial relief with 
structural adjustment counterparts by 
the states. An agreement has already 
been struck with Rio de Janeiro, but its 
implementation depends on Congress 
approving a general framework for debt 
renegotiation and financial recovery that 
would be valid for all states, and on the 
Legislative Assembly of Rio de Janeiro 
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7 Going forward, the key question is 
what the state of the economy and the 
political atmosphere will be in the months 
leading up to the October 2018 election. 
The correction of the disaster produced by 
the PT cycle will take time and will not bear 
political fruit in the short term. One should 
also factor in the destruction that the Lava 
Jato is already causing within the existing 
political leadership. 
 After the latest elections in the United 
States, some analysts, half-seriously, 
half-ironically, started asking who would 
become the Brazilian Trump. The national 
realities are not the same, but one thing is 
certain: Brazil does not lack the same anti-
establishment anger that brought Donald 
Trump to the White House.
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